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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRESTVIEW-HOLLADAY HOME OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah 
corporation, et al., 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
-vs-
ENGH FLORAL COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, dba ENGH FLORAL 
AND GARDEN CENTER, et al., 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
Case No. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action attacking the validity of an amend-
ment to the zoning ordinance of Salt Lake County reclassifying 
property owned by appellant Engh Floral Company located at 
2098 East 3900 South from Agriculture A-l to Residential R-M 
and Commercial C-2. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 
IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court held the zoning amendment constituted 
spot zoning and was therefore invalid. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Salt Lake County seeks reversal of the 
lower court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Henry Engh and his family have been engaged in the 
nursery, landscaping and floral business at 2098 East 3900 
South since 1932. R-75. From the inception of the business 
there has been a gift shop associated with the floral and nursery 
business. In 1932 the area was rural with very few residents in 
the area. R-95. No zoning was in effect in the area until 
1953, at which time the Engh Floral property was zoned Agriculture 
A-l. At that time, Engh Floral became a non-conforming use as the 
Agriculture A-l zone does not permit retail sales of nursery 
products. The evidence showed the Engh Floral business has been 
very successful and has continued to expand in volume over the 
years. By 1972 its gross revenue exceeded $1,250,000.00 and it 
employed 75 people. R-75, R-88. 
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The area surrounding Engh Floral has developed as a 
single family residential neighborhood interspersed with a 
number of commercial uses. R-22. At the corner of 23rd East 
and 39th South, which is about 600 feet from the east end of 
the Engh property, there is commercial C-l and C-2 zoning 
containing a Safeway store, a Sprouse-Reitz store, two service 
stations, a drive-in restaurant, a bank, and several other retail 
shops and businesses. Ex. P-10, R-36. Immediately across 39th 
South Street from the Engh property are a retail egg sales out-
let and a firewood sales outlet. Ex. P-10, R-36. On 23rd East 
in the area of Engh Floral there are condominiums and Olympus 
High School. R-47. 39th South is scheduled for widening and 
is not desirable for single family residential use. R-42. 
On February 8, 1972, Engh Floral Company filed an 
application to rezone its property consisting of a total of 
approximately 13 acres from Agriculture A-l to Commercial C-3. 
Ex. P-8. The application was made because of the difficulty 
that Engh Floral was having in operating under the scope of 
its non-conforming use. Ex. P-8. C-3 zoning is the most 
intense commercial use zoning under the zoning ordinances of 
Salt Lake County. R-27. In response to the application, the 
Salt Lake County Planning staff made several area studies which 
included more than the Engh property. Ex. P-10, R-39. During 
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the course of the studies the staff originally recommended 
that the application for C-3 zoning be denied, suggesting 
that R-M zoning be explored. Ex. D-17, R-14-18. The final 
recommendation to the Planning staff, based upon the area 
studies, was to rezone the existing retail outlet of Engh Floral 
from A-l to Commercial C-2 to acknowledge the existing non-
conforming use and to allow Engh Floral to continue to expand 
and modernize its business and to zone the remaining ground 
from A-l to Residential R-M as a buffer between the commercial 
business and the single family residential area adjacent to the 
Engh property. R-39. At the suggestion of the staff, Engh 
Floral amended its application to conform to the staff's recom-
mendation and the staff recommended approval of the amended 
application. R-39, R-40. 
On May 2, 1972, the Salt Lake County Planning Commission 
unanimously recommended approval of the amended application. 
Ex. D-2, R-41. On August 16, 1973, the Board of County 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County followed the recommendation of 
the Planning Commission and approved the amended zoning applica-
tion by a 2 to 1 vote. Ex. D-4. This action was taken after 
the Salt Lake County Commission had adopted the Big Cottonwood 
Master Plan which was done by Williams & Mocine, a regional 
planning consulting firm from San Francisco. Ex. D-20, R-44. 
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The master plan showed the Engh Floral property as commercial 
and residential R-M. Ex. D-20. 
On October 15, 1973, respondents filed this action 
challenging the validity of the zoning amendment for Engh 
Floral. At trial, which was held on the 16th day of January, 
1974, respondents offered no evidence that the rezoning would 
affect the value or use of any of respondents1 properties. 
R-6. Despite this fact the court held respondents had standing 
to maintain the lawsuit and invalidated the zoning. T-153. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS HAD NO STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF THE 
ZONING AMENDMENT BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO SHOW THAT IT AFFECTED 
THE VALUE OF THEIR PROPERTY. 
In order to have standing to challenge the validity 
of a zoning regulation, the general rule is that a neighboring 
property owner must demonstrate that the zoning amendment he 
seeks to enjoin will adversely affect the use of his property. 
Where plaintiffs have failed to plead and show damages from the 
rezoning of nearby property, their cases have been dismissed. 
In Ratner v. City of Richmond, 201 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 1964), 
the court dismissed plaintiff's complaint in a suit to enjoin 
the enforcement of a zoning amendment which allowed a shopping 
center. The court stated: 
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"The complainant must show that enforcement 
of the ordinance will affect his personal 
or property rights and that it will cause 
him personal, direct and irreparable 
injury and not merely that he suffers in some 
indefinite way in common with people 
generally." 
In Housing Authority of City of Melbourne v. Richardson, 196 
So.2d 489, 492 (Fla. 1967), the court reached a similar result. 
In that case the plaintiffs failed to plead any damage from a 
zoning amendment allowing a low rent housing project near their 
property. The court reversed the lower court's failure to dis-
miss the complaint, stating: 
"While it is not proper for plaintiffs to 
plead evidence, it is necessary that they 
plead with some specificity using ultimate 
facts to show the relationship of plaintiffs' 
property to Brooker Heights and just how 
they will be adversely affected by the zoning 
ordinance. (citations omitted) In the 
instant case we are not apprised as to how 
or what degree plaintiffs will be adversely 
affected, if at all. Thus, the complaint 
is insufficient because it does not appear the 
plaintiffs have standing in either capacity 
to complain of defendant's actions." 
Numerous other cases have been dismissed because of the plaintiffs' 
failure either to plead damage from the rezoning or to show 
damage at trial. Parcesepe v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town 
of Goshen, 221 A.2d 270 (Conn. 1966); Kalvaitis v. Port Chester, 
235 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1962); Haber v. Board of Estimate, 305 N.Y.S.2d 
520 (1969); S. A. Lynch Investment Corp. v. Miami, 151 So.2d 
858 (Fla. App. 1963). 
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Respondents, in their brief to the lower court, 
made the general statement that nearby residents of land 
rezoned have standing to maintain a lawsuit to challenge a 
zoning amendment. To support their position respondents quote 
from 37 A.L.R.2d 1143, which digests many of the cases dealing 
with the issue of standing to challenge the rezoning of a 
neighbor's property. The quotation from the A.L.R. article 
reads as follows: 
"The general conclusion to be drawn from 
the cases is that an owner of real estate 
which is subject to zoning regulations has 
sufficient legal standing to challenge as 
invalid or void, whether for arbitrariness, 
unreasonableness, capriciousness, or other 
cause, an ordinance rezoning or reclassify-
ing neighboring land, or altering the 
amending zoning regulations affecting the 
same, where the changes would inflict on 
the first mentioned owner a special and 
peculiar injury. Regarding the latter 
statement, it ordinarily seems to be suffi-
cient to allege and show that plaintiff's 
property would be substantially depreciated 
by the matters complained of, and the courts 
evidently being inclined to assume, absent 
contrary indications, that all other prop-
erty of the zone, municipality, or neighbor-
hood, or the property thereof generally would 
not also be substantially depreciated by the 
changes." (emphasis added) 
Respondents ignore the requirement of the law emphasized in 
the above quotation that a party must "allege and show" damage 
to his property from the rezoning of neighboring property to 
have standing to challenge the rezoning. They offered abso-
lutely no evidence that the rezoning would affect the value or 
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use of any of their properties. R-6. The only evidence 
appellants offered relevant to standing was the proximity of 
property owned by members of the association to the Engh 
property. However, courts have rejected the contention that 
mere proximity of a person's property to rezoned property 
establishes standing to attack the rezoning. In 222 East 
Chestnut Street Corp. v. Board of Appeals, 152 N.E.2d 465 
(111. 1958), a case similar to this one, the plaintiff therein 
failed to offer evidence of any damage from the rezoning of 
adjacent property for a parking lot, claiming that proximity 
of his property to the rezoned property was sufficient. The 
court in that case first noted the general rule for standing 
to attack an ordinance rezoning neighboring property: 
"The law is well settled that the right to 
review a final administrative decision is 
limited to those parties to the proceeding 
before the administrative agency whose rights, 
privileges, or duties are affected by the 
decision. In recently applying this 
principle in zoning litigation to which the 
present plaintiff was also a party, we held 
it is incumbent upon the party seeking review 
to both allege and prove that the Board's 
decision would in fact adversely affect such 
party. (citations omitted) This is in accord 
with the majority view which holds that the 
right to maintain a suit in such cases 
depends upon whether the zoning inflicts a 
special or peculiar injury upon the party 
bringing the suit." 152 N.E.2d at 466. 
The court then stated that plaintiff must prove injury to his 
property from the rezoning of neighboring property: 
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"The complaint for administrative review 
clearly alleges that the effect of the 
Board's decision will be to cause injury, 
damage and depreciation in value of 
plaintiff's property, but the problem of 
its right to maintain an action resolves 
itself into a question of whether such 
allegations find support in the proof." 
The court went on to reject plaintiff's contention that mere 
proximity of his property to the property rezoned relieved him 
from showing damage to his property: 
"Here there is a complete absence of proof 
relating to the value of plaintiff's prop-
erty and of the effect the parking lot will 
have on such values. It is true, as 
plaintiff suggests, that the proximity 
of certain uses will depreciate the rental 
value of nearby property, but we have found 
no authority holding that the mere showing 
of the existence of such uses relieves a 
party from affirmatively proving the alleged 
damage to his property. We conclude, there-
fore, that we may not take judicial notice of 
the matters prayed and that there is a 
complete failure of proof to support the 
allegations of special injury made in the 
plaintiff's complaint." 152 N.E.2d at 467. 
The contention that mere proximity to the land rezoned 
was sufficient to show standing was also rejected in the case of 
Kyser v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 230 A.2d 595, 598 
(Conn. 1967). In that case, the immediate neighbors of a 
property owner who had been granted a variance by the Zoning 
Board of Appeals brought an action challenging the variance. 
The lower court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiffs 
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failed to offer any evidence that they are aggrieved by the 
decision of the Board of Appeals. The Supreme Court of 
Connecticut upheld the decisionf stating: 
"The Kysers urged that to prove aggrieve-
ment it was unnecessary for them to 
establish more than the fact that they were 
owners of property adjoining that for which 
the variance was granted. Although it is 
undoubtedly true that many, if not most, 
cases the owner of property adjoining that 
for which a variance has been granted is 
able to prove aggrievement, proximity alone 
does not establish it. Here, the question 
of aggrievement was put in issue by the 
pleadings and the Kysers make no claim that 
aside from proving the proximity of their 
premises. There is nothing in the record 
or the appendix to the brief of the Kysers 
to show that the value of their property 
would be specifically lessened or any other 
property or legal right of theirs would be 
specifically and injuriously affected by 
the granting of the variance." 
In the case herein the lower court in its memorandum 
decision concluded that respondents had "standing since special 
damages would be sustained". However, the record is void of 
any evidence of damage to plaintiffs from the zoning amendment, 
and the court made no finding of fact or conclusion of law 
concerning standing. For these reasons appellant Salt Lake 
County submits the lower court erred in not dismissing plain-
tiffs1 complaint after trial on the grounds of lack of standing. 
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ZONING ORDINANCE 
REZONING ENGH FLORAL CONSTITUTED A SPOT ZONE. 
The concept of a spot zone generally involves a 
case where a small tract of land is rezoned, granting it special 
privileges inconsistent with the zoning in the area and not 
pursuant to a zoning or master plan for the area. Marshall v. 
Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704 (1943). However, the 
Marshall case noted that zoning districts need not "be confined 
and rigidly limited to one particular use" and upheld zoning for 
small business areas within a residential area as long as such 
zoning was based upon some reasonable zoning plan. Numerous 
other cases have also held that small commercial areas may be 
properly located within residential districts. Rust v. City 
of Eugene, Oregon, 74 P.2d 374 (Ore. 1971); Levinsky v. Zoning 
Comm. of Bridgeport, 127 A.2d 872 (Conn. 1966); Bishop v. 
Board of Zoning Appeals, 53 A.2d 659 (N.J. 1947). In the latter 
case, a case similar to the case herein because it involved a 
business use prior to the original zoning which was later zoned 
commercial constituting it the only business area in a large 
residential area, the court rejected the contention that the 
zoning was not done pursuant to a plan, stating: 
"The city adopted such a plan. To permit 
business in a small area within a resi-
dential zone may fall within its scope and 
to do so, unless it amounts to unreasonable 
or arbitrary action, is not unlawful." 
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The case herein differs from cases invalidating 
commercial zoning within residential areas as spot zoning in 
several important respects. In cases which have struck down 
zoning on the grounds of spot zoning, the courts have found 
that the zoning was solely for the benefit of the property 
owner, not pursuant to a general plan for the area. In this 
case the testimony showed that the rezoning of Engh Floral 
property was done as part of a general plan for the area to 
provide a proven need for the commercial business of Engh Floral 
in the area and to attempt to resolve problems between the 
existing commercial use of Engh Floral and the residential 
neighbors. R-39. Mr. Clayne Ricks, the Planning Director 
for Salt Lake County, testified that the Planning staff recom-
mended the C-2 zoning on the basis that acknowledgment of the 
existing commercial use would allow Engh Floral to continue its 
business and to grow and compete. R-39. This is certainly in 
the interest of the community as Engh Floral is a thriving 
business, providing a needed service and employing 75 people. 
The plan creates a buffer between the commercial use and the 
single family residential uses in the area by providing an area 
for a higher residential use between Engh Floral and the single 
family homes. However, the rezoning in itself does not permit 
other commercial uses on the property because all commercial uses 
on a tract of land over one acre need conditional use approval 
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which is discretionary with the Planning Commission, R-57. 
The rezoning plan eliminates the continuing problem as to the 
scope of Engh Floral's non-conforming use. Mr. Ricks testified 
that R-M zoning is often used as a buffer between commercial 
uses and single family homes. R-64. The rezoning of the land 
into a residential R-M zone provides the possibility of condo-
miniums in the area for people who may wish to sell their homes 
but would like to stay in the immediate area. R-59-60. 
The Planning staff put a considerable amount of time 
and study into the problem and reached their final recommendation 
after considering several alternatives. The effect of the 
decision of the lower court is to substitute its judgment for 
the judgment of County planning experts as to reasonableness of 
its zoning plan. This decision is contrary to the rule laid 
down by this court in prior zoning cases as to the limited 
judicial review of a zoning plan. This rule was noted in the 
Marshall case: 
"A zoning plan should not be jettisoned 
merely because it may be vulnerable to 
attack from one of these pillboxes. It 
must be considered as a whole to see if 
it's designed to accomplish such a 
purpose; even if it could promote the 
general welfare or even if it is rea-
sonably debatable that it is in the 
interest of the general welfare, the 
act should be upheld . . . ." 141 
P.2d at 709. 
That a zoning plan should be upheld by the court unless arbitrary 
or capricious has been reiterated in numerous other zoning cases. 
See Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17 U.2d 300, 410 P.2d 764 
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(1966); Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp., 123 Utah 107, 255 P.2d 
723 (1953); Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 116 
Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177 (1949). 
The Engh case differs from spot zoning cases in other 
ways. Most spot zoning cases involved solely a small proposed 
commercial area in an exclusive residential neighborhood. The 
Engh property is not located in an exclusive residential area, 
but rather, on 39th South, a street containing many commercial 
uses within the immediate area, including commercial zoning within 
a short distance of the Engh property. The Engh property is not 
a small parcel, but rather, contains approximately 13 acres. 
Rarely have the courts found spot zoning where the parcel rezoned 
is that large. A survey of the size of parcels where spot zoning 
was alleged is reported in 3 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, 
§5.07, pp. 253-254: 
"It seems clear that the size of the area 
figured predominately in the outcome of 
the litigation. 
"An alignment of cases examining prepara-
tion of this chapter supports the same 
premise. Among the cases where the exact 
size of the area could be determined from 
the decision, spot zoning was detected in 
some amendments which reclassified parcels 
ranging in size from single lot to 13 acre 
tract. But nearly all amendments affecting 
parcels of three acres or less were dis-
approved. In sharp contrast, cases in which the 
spot zoning argument was rejected involved 
tracts of 11 acres or more with few exceptions. 
Small area changes were approved where other 
factors than the size seemed critical to the 
court." 
Thus, the R-M zoning should not have been struck down by the 
lower court even if it held, contrary to the majority decisions 
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in other jurisdictions, that acknowledgment of an existing 
commercial use was not an appropriate reason for approving the 
C-2 zoning for the Engh property. Even the original staff 
recommendation suggested the possibility of R-M zoning for this 
large parcel on 39th South. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REZONING OF THE ENGH 
PROPERTY WAS A SPOT ZONE BECAUSE IT WAS DONE TO ACKNOWLEDGE A 
NON-CONFORMING USE. 
The lower court in its memorandum decision concluded 
that rezoning of the Engh property was a spot zone since it was 
done to acknowledge a non-conforming use. However, the majority 
of courts have not even applied the rule of spot zoning to the 
acknowledgment of existing non-conforming uses. This exception 
to the rule is stated as follows in 62 C.J.S. 226, §12, p. 468: 
"The reclassification of certain property 
for a use different from that of the sur-
rounding areas is not invalid, where such 
property was subject to a non-conforming 
use, the effect of which was the same as 
though the property had been originally 
classified for the use to which it was 
subsequently changed." See Chayt v. Mary-
land Jockey Club, 18 A.2d 858 (Md. 1941); 
Keller v. Council Bluffs, 66 N.W.2d 113 
(Iowa 1954); Goddard v. Stowers, 272 S.W.2d 
400 (Tex. 1954). 
In the Goddard case cited above, the court upheld a 
zoning amendment of property from residential to commercial 
to acknowledge a non-conforming grocery and filling station 
which had existed 10 years. The court rejected the contention 
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that the rezoning constituted spot zoning, stating: 
"Neither do we have a case of unjusti-
fiable spot zoning, the issue being 
ostensibly raised by appellants but 
not in fact, defendant's governing body 
simply decided in view of the great 
increase of population of the named 
highways, especially since 1951 . . . 
that the store's location and non-
conforming use be legalized . . . ." 
The facts in the case herein are similar to facts in 
the Goddard case. The population in the area of Engh Floral 
has greatly increased in the past few years and 39th South has 
become a very busy street justifying the need for commercial 
zoning on 39th South which would acknowledge a successful non-
conforming use. 
CONCLUSION 
The standing issue in this case is of critical 
importance, not only for the disposition to this case, but 
also for the precedent it will establish in future cases of a 
similar nature. The effect of the lower court's decision is 
that no evidence of standing need be shown to attack the rezoning 
of another person's property. This holding is contrary to the 
established law in this area which requires that a person must 
have some special interest in a law to bring a lawsuit attacking 
the validity of the law. Because respondents have failed to 
meet this basic requirement for attacking a zoning ordinance 
by offering some evidence of affect on their property by the 
rezoning of the Engh property, appellant Salt Lake County submits 
that the lower court's decision should be reversed. 
If this court upholds the lower court's decision that 
respondents have standing to bring this lawsuit, then appellant 
Salt Lake County submits that the lower court erred in holding 
that the zoning was arbitrary and capricious. As in most 
controversial zoning cases, there appears to have been no perfect 
solution to the problem of the application of Engh Floral to 
have its property rezoned from A-l to C-3. The decision of the 
Planning staff, after considerable study of the facts, to 
recommend denial of the original application of Engh Floral and 
to recommend instead C-2 and R-M zoning is a reasonable solution 
to a difficult problem. The lower court had to completely 
ignore the record to have found that this solution was arbitrary 
and capricious and for this reason appellant Salt Lake County 
asks that the lower court's decision be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
DONALD SAWAYA 
Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney 
KENT S. LEWIS 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
Salt Lake County/ Ralph Y. McClure, 
William E. Dunn and Pete Kutulas 
-17-
